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Introduction
Tortious interference with contractual relations is a new and con-
troversial tort. This tort was first recognized in 1853, in the English
case of Lumley v. Gye.1 In Lumley, the plaintiff, a theater manager,
contracted with a well-known singer to perform at the theater.2 After
the singer signed the contract, the defendant, who operated a rival
theater company, induced the singer to break her contract and sing for
the defendant instead.3 The plaintiff filed a complaint against the
competing theater alleging that the defendant, knowing of the con-
tract and maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff, enticed and pro-
cured the singer to refuse to perform for the plaintiff while her
contract was still in force.4
* Robert L. Tucker is a principal member of the law firm of Buckingham, Doolittle
& Burroughs, a Legal Professional Association, in Akron, Ohio.
1. 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). Lumley is generally regarded as the turning point
in the development of inducement of breach of contract as a separate tort. See RESTATE-
cMEN" (SEcorN) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. c (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SEcoNrD)].
2. See Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 749.
3. See id at 750.
4. See id. at 749-50.
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The Lumley court, consisting of a panel of four judges, held in
favor of the plaintiff in a three-to-one decision.5 Each of the four
judges wrote a separate opinion, but those written by Judges
Crompton and Erle laid the foundation for the tort presently known
as tortious interference with contractual relations. Judge Crompton
wrote:
In deciding this case on the narrower ground [that the case
included a master-servant relationship for which an action for
interference had long been recognized], I wish by no means to
be considered ... as saying that in no case except that of master
and servant is an action maintainable for maliciously inducing
another to break a contract to the injury of the person with
whom such contract had been made.'
Judge Erle, concurring that a cause of action existed, formulated the
tort in the following language:
He who maliciously procures a damage to another by viola-
tion of his right ought to be made to indemnify; and that,
whether he procures an actionable wrong or a breach of con-
tract. He who procures the non-delivery of goods according to
contract may inflict an injury, the same as he who procures the
abstraction of goods after delivery; and both ought on the same
ground to be made responsible.7
Forty years later, in Temperton v. Russell,8 a three-judge panel of
an English court of appeal expanded the cause of action in two signifi-
cant ways. First, the Temperton court held that the tort of intentional
interference could include interference with contracts in which no per-
sonal services were involvedf Second, it held that the tort could in-
clude interference with prospective, as well as existing, contractual
relations.10
By the early part of the twentieth century, the tort of intentional
interference with contract began to enjoy a general, but not universal,
acceptance in the United States." In 1939, tortious interference was
recognized by the American Law Institute in section 766 of the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts. 2 As formulated by the authors of the
Restatement, the tort of tortious interference provided protection
5. See id at 768-69.
6. Id. at 754.
7. Id. at 756.
8. 1 Q.B. 715 (1893).
9. Id. at 727-28.
10. See id. at 728.
11. See Charles E. Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARv. L. REv.
728, 730 app. at 764-68 (1928).
12. The formulation of the elements of the tort was set forth in section 766:
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against interference with an existing contract, and also against inter-
ference with reasonable expectancies of commercial relations.13
Sections 767 through 774 of the original Restatement then set
forth various "privileges," by which an actor's conduct in interfering
with an existing or prospective business relationship could be excused.
The original Restatement did not directly address the issue of whether
providing truthful information to another could constitute an actiona-
ble interference with business relations.14
When these sections of the Restatement were rewritten in 1979,
several significant changes were made to section 766. First, section
766 of the original Restatement was broken down into three separate
subsections. Section 766 of the Restatement (Second)'5 addresses in-
terference with existing contractual relations; section 766A16 ad-
dresses intentional interference with another's performance of his
Except as stated in Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, in-
duces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to
a) perform a contract with another, or
b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for
the harm caused thereby.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 766 (1939) [hereinafter REs'ATEMENTr].
13. Comment "b" to section 766 of the Restatement explained that:
The added element of a definite contract may be a basis for greater protec-
tion; but some protection is appropriate against unjustified interference with rea-
sonable expectancies of commercial relations even when an existing contract is
lacking .... The differentiation between them relates primarily to the scope of
the privileges, or the kind and amount of interference that is justifiable in view of
the differences in the facts.
REsTATEmENT, supra note 12, § 766 cmt. b.
14. Comment "b" to section 767 of the original Restatement stated that fraudulent mis-
representations are also ordinarily improper means of inducement and are not privileged.
Id. § 767 cmt. b. It added that the actor may be held liable under section 766 even when
the fraudulent representation is not of such a character as to be tortious on other grounds.
Id. By the same token, comment "b" expressed the view that an actor may supply false
information that would be independently actionable, but would not constitute a basis for
liability under section 766 because of the actor's good faith belief in the truth of the state-
ment. Id. Nothing in comment "b" addresses the impact of the communication of truthful
information. Id. In addition, section 772 of the original Restatement, unlike its counterpart
in the Restatement (Second), addressed only a privilege to provide honest advice to another
within the scope of a request for advice. Id. § 772. It did not go on, as section 772 of the
Restatement (Second) now does, to protect the communication of truthful information,
whether requested or not. 1d.
15. Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) provides that:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by in-
ducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is sub-
ject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the
failure of the third person to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 766.
16. Section 766A of the Restatement (Second) provides that:
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own contract; and section 766B17 addresses intentional interference
with prospective contractual relations. While section 766 of the origi-
nal Restatement dealt with inducing a breach of either an existing con-
tract or prospective business relations, the Restatement (Second) deals
with these two topics separately.
A requirement that the actionable conduct be both "intentional"
and "improper" constituted the second major change.18 Sections 767
through 773 of the Restatement (Second) describe what constitutes
"improper" interference. Rather than referring to these factors as
"privileges" as the original Restatement did, the Restatement (Second)
now refers to "factors in determining whether interference is im-
proper." 9 Despite this change, the factors identified in these suc-
ceeding sections continue to be referred to, erroneously, as
"privileges."2 0
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person, by
preventing the other from performing the contract or causing his performance to
be more expensive or burdensome, is subject to liability to the other for the pecu-
niary loss resulting to him.
Id. § 766A.
17. Section 766B of the Restatement (Second) provides that:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether
the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation.
Id. § 766B.
18. The requirement that the actor's conduct be "intentional" is further underscored
by section 766C of the Restatement (Second), which specifically provides that there is no
liability for merely negligent interference with existing or prospective contractual relations:
§ 766C. Negligent Interference with Contract or Prospective Contractual
Relation
One is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving from physical
harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor's negligently
(a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or
(b) interfering with the other's performance of his contract or making the
performance more expensive or burdensome, or
(c) interfering with the other's acquiring a contractual relation with a third
person.
Id. § 766C.
19. Id. § 767.
20. See, e.g., Green Constr. Co. v. Black & Veatch Engrs. & Architects, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5333 (D. Kan. 1990) ("One of the established privileges ... is contained in § 772 of
the Restatement .... 1"). A "privilege" is an affirmative defense, as to which the defendant
bears the burden of proof once a prima facie case has been made by the plaintiff. See
generally BLAcK's LAW DICnONARY 1197-98 (6th ed. 1990). By contrast, under a proper
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The Restatement (Second) expressly adopted the requirement that
the party seeking to establish a prima facie case of tortious interfer-
ence must demonstrate that the actor's conduct is "improper."
Notwithstanding this requirement, confusion exists about whether the
lack of "justification" or the "impropriety" of the actor's conduct is an
element as to which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, or is a
defense as to which the actor bears the burden of proof.21 Some
courts hold that the factors enumerated in sections 767 through 773 of
the Restatement (Second) regarding the propriety or impropriety of
the conduct are affirmative defenses, as to which the defendant carries
the burden of proof.1 In light of the express inclusion of the element
of impropriety in the Restatement (Second) formulation of the tort, the
better view is that the burden of proof should be on the plaintiff with
respect to that issue. As the Supreme Court of Washington observed
in Pleas v. City of Seattle:23
The authors of the second Restatement of Torts modified
this approach in favor of one that defines the tort as involving
"improper" as well as intentional interference....
This change was made in response to a concern articulated
by many courts and commentators that the prima facie tort ap-
proach in which every intentiofial infliction of harm is prima fa-
cie tortious unless justified. This approach required too little of
the plaintiff insofar as it left the major issue in the controversy-
the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct-to be resolved by
asserting an affirmative defense.
Although its authors declined to take a clear position on
the matter, the revised language of the second Restatement can
be interpreted to require the plaintiff to show in the first in-
stance that the defendant's interference was improper.24
reading of sections 766 and 766B of the Restatement (Second), the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proving that the interference was both "intentional" and "improper". See RESTAATE-
MrNT SECOND, supra note 1, § § 766, 766B.
21. See Thomas J. Collin et al., Ohio Tortious Interference Law and the Role of Privi-
lege and Competition, 18 DAYTON L. REv. 635, 668 (1993) ("The Restatement acknowl-
edges the fact that there is confusion in the decisions as to whether the issue of justification
or privilege is properly treated as an element of the plaintiff's case or as an affirmative
defense to be pleaded and proved by the defendant."). Those authors concluded that the
weight of authority in Ohio appears to treat the issue of absence of privilege as an element
of the tort. See id at 671.
22. See, e.g., Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("Illinois courts consider privilege a defense to tortious interference, and not an
element whose absence must be pleaded (or, more importantly, proved) by plaintiff.").
23. 774 P.2d 1158 (Wash. 1989).
24. Id. at 1162 (citations omitted); see also Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc.,
809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991) ("However, if the interference is not improper, a necessary
element of the tort is lacking.") (citations omitted).
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A third major change in the tort of business interference, as for-
mulated in the Restatement (Second), was protection for the communi-
cation of truthful information. Section 772 of the original Restatement
provided no express protection for the communication of truthful in-
formation.2' Section 772 of the Restatement (Second) specifically
states that one who intentionally provides truthful information to a
third person which then causes the third person not to enter into or to
perform a contract with another, does not interfere "improperly" with
the other's contractual relations.26 Comment "b" to section 772 elab-
orates on the position held by drafters of this section of the Restate-
ment (Second). That comment states that the interference caused by
providing truthful information is "clearly not improper."27 It also pro-
vides that the truthful information exception to liability is available
"whether or not the information is requested."28
Under the Restatement (Second), there is functionally no differ-
ence between sections 766 and 766B. Various courts have recognized
that the tort of interference with existing contractual relations under
section 766 of the Restatement (Second) is merely one branch of the
tort of interference with prospective economic advantage protected
25. Section 772 of the original Restatement provided:
§ 772. Privilege to Advise.
One is privileged purposely to cause another not to perform a contract, or
enter into or continue a business relation, with a third person by giving honest
advice to the other within the scope of a request for advice made by him, except
that, if the actor is under a special duty to the third person with reference to the
accuracy of the advice, he is subject to liability for breach of that duty.
REsTATEmENT, supra note 12, § 772.
26. Section 772 of the Restatement (Second) provides that:
§ 772. Advice as Proper or Improper Interference.
One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not
to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere
improperly with the other's contractual relation, by giving the third person
(a) Truthful information, or
(b) Honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice.
RESrATEmENT (SEcoND), supra note 1, § 772.
27. Comment "b" to section 772 provides as follows:
b. Truthful Information. There is of course no liability for interference with
a contract or with a prospective contractual relation on the part of one who
merely gives truthful information to another. The interference in this instance is
clearly not improper. This is true even though the facts are marshaled in such a
way that they speak for themselves and the person to whom the information is
given immediately recognizes them as a reason for breaking his contract or refus-
ing to deal with another. It is also true whether or not the information is
requested.
Id. cmt. b.
28. ld.
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under section 766B.29 Both the original Restatement3' and the Restate-
ment (Second)31 acknowledge that the tort of interference with busi-
ness relations is of recent vintage.
It has been observed that "all fifty states now recognize some
form of tortious interference with contract. '32 Prior to 1979, the vast
majority of states expressly adopted or cited with approval the formu-
lation of tortious interference as expressed in the original Restate-
ment.33 Since the publication of the Restatement (Second) in 1979,
most states have expressly adopted or cited with approval the some-
what altered formulation of the tort set forth in section 76634 and/or
29. Oaksmith v. Brusich, 774 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1989); Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d
700 (Alaska 1984); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 537 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1975).
30. The authors of Comment "a" to section 767 of the original Restatement conceded:
"Unlike the law of defamation, this branch of the law has not crystallized a complete set of
definite rules as to the existence or non-existence of privilege to act in the manner stated in
§ 766." REsTATEmENT, supra note 12, § 767 cmt. b.
31. The introductory note to the chapter of the Restatement (Second) dealing with
interference with contract or prospective contractual relations admits: "[T]he law in this
area has not fully congealed but is still in a formative stage. The several forms of the tort
set forth in §§ 766 to 766B are often not distinguished by the courts, and cases have been
cited among them somewhat indiscriminately." Introduction to RESrATEMENT (SEcoND),
supra note 1, at 5.
32. Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference with Contract" Market Efficiency and Indi-
vidual Liberty Considerations, 27 CON. L. REv. 279, 292 (1994).
33. See Long v. Newby, 488 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1971); Hadley v. Southwest Properties,
Inc., 570 P.2d 190 (Ariz. 1977); Mason v. Funderburk, 446 S.W.2d 543 (Ark. 1969); World-
wide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 84 Cal. App. 3d 803 (1978); Comtrol, Inc. v.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 P.2d 1082 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Deoudes v. G.B.
Macke Corp., 153 A.2d 309 (D.C. 1959); Bowl-Mor Co., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 297 A.2d
61 (Del. Ch. 1972); NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Twin Falls Farm & City Distrib., Inc. v. D & B Supply Co., Inc., 528 P.2d 1286 (Idaho 1974);
Herman v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 244 N.E.2d 809 (Ill. 1969); Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co.
v. Shane Co., 143 N.E.2d 415 (Ind. 1957); Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W2d 211 (Iowa 1970);
Taylor v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs Local Union 101, 368 P.2d 8 (Kan. 1962); Derby Rd.
Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958); Daugherty v. Kessler, 286 A.2d 95
(Md. 1972); Pino v. Trans-Atlantic Marine, Inc., 265 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1970); Bahr v.
Miller Bros. Creamery, 112 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 1961); Stephenson v. Plastics Corp. of Am.,
Inc., 150 N.W.2d 668 (Minn. 1967); Downey v. United Weather-Proofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d
976 (Mo. 1953); Bricker v. Crane, 387 A.2d 321 (N.H. 1978); Middlesex Concrete Prods. &
Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 181 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1962); Wolf v. Perry, 339
P.2d 679 (N.M. 1959); Albemarle Theater, Inc. v. Bayberry Realty Corp., 277 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1967); Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 221 S.E.2d 282 (N.C. 1976); Juhasz v. Quik Shops, Inc.,
379 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977); Luisi v. Bank of Commerce, 449 P.2d 441 (Or. 1969);
BirI v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1960); Willard v. Claborn, 419 S.W.2d 168
(Tenn. 1967); Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1969); Scymanski v. Dufault, 491
P.2d 1050 (Wash. 1972); Mendelson v. Blatz Brewing Co., 101 N.W.2d 805 (Wis. 1960);
Board of TIbstees of Weston County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978).
34. See Barber v. Business Prods. Ctr., 677 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 1996); Bendix Corp. v.
Adams, 610 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980); Snow v. Western Say. & Loan Ass'n, 730 P.2d 204
(Ariz. 1986); L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278 (Ark. 1984); Pacific Gas &
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section 766B.1 A few states seem indiscriminately to apply the for-
Elec. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1990); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Fried-
man, 846 P. 2d 159 (Colo. 1993); Blake v. Levy, 464 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1983); Sorrells v. Gar-
finckel's, 565 A.2d 285 (App. D.C. 1989); Turchi v. Salaman, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 191
(1990), affd, 1991 Del. LEXIS 191 (Del. 1991); Peninsula Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. DKH
Properties, Ltd., 616 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Wise v. State Bd. for Examina-
tion, Qualification & Registration of Architects, 274 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 1981); Jensen v.
Westberg, 772 P.2d 228 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988); Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870
(Ill. 1991); Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1991);
Anderson Plasterers v. Meinecke, 543 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1996); Turner v. Halliburton Co.,
722 P.2d 1106 (Kan. 1986); NCAA v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1988); 9 to 5 Fashions,
Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112
(Md. 1994); G.S. Enters, Inc. v. Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1991);
Hutton v. Roberts, 451 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Nordling v. Northern States
Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991); Vestal v. Oden, 500 So. 2d 954 (Miss. 1987);
Greenwood v. Sherfield, 895 S.W.2d 169 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Hoschler v. Kozlik, 529
N.W.2d 822 (Neb. Ct. App. 1955); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. City of Boulder City, 797
P.2d 946 (Nev. 1990); Mountain Springs Water Co., Inc. v. Mountain Lakes Village Dist.,
489 A.2d 647 (N.H. 1985); Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 563 A.2d 31
(NJ. 1989); Quintana v. First Interstate Bank, 737 P.2d 896 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Kronos,
Inc. v. A.V.X. Corp., 595 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1993); Peterson v. Zerr, 477 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.
1991); Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio 1995); Morrow Dev.
Corp. v. American Bank & Trust Co., 875 P.2d 411 (Okla. 1994); Uptown Heights Assocs.
L.P. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 P.2d 639 (Or. 1995); Maier v. Maretti, 1995 Pa. Super. LEXIS
4010 (1995); Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1986); Todd v. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 321 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1992); St. Benedict's Dev. Co.
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Williams v. Chittenden Trust Co., 484
A.2d 911 (Vt. 1984); Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97 (Va. 1985); Pleas v. City of Seattle,
774 P.2d 1158 (Wash. 1989); Sampson Invs. v. Jondex Corp., 499 N.W.2d 177 (Wis. 1993);
Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809 P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1991).
35. See Oaksmith v. Brusich, 774 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1989); Bar J Bar Cattle Co. v. Pace,
763 P.2d 545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway Stores, 49 Cal. Rptr.
2d 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493 (Colo. 1995); Blake v.
Levy, 464 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1983); C.P.M. Indus. v. I.C.I. Americas, Inc., 1990 Del. Super.
LEXIS 88 (Feb. 27, 1990); Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1992); Noller v. GMC
Truck & Coach Div. Corp., 772 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1989); NCAA v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855
(Ky. 1988); Macklin v. Robert Logan Assocs., 639 A.2d 112 (Md. 1994); United Truck
Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990); Winiemko v. Valenti, 513 N.W.2d
181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982);
Nichols v. Tr-State Brick & Tile Co., Inc., 608 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1992); Cook v. M.F.A.
Livestock Ass'n, 700 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Omaha Mining Co., Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 415 N.W.2d 111 (Neb. 1987); Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Lines, Inc. v.
Gray Line Tours, 792 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1990); Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 563 A.2d 31 (NJ. 1989); Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1981);
Laiso v. Cassetta, 550 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1989); Hunter v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 654 N.E.2d
405 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 714 P.2d 618 (Or. App.
1986), affd in part, 733 P.2d 430 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co.,
412 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1979); Federal Auto Body Works v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 447 A.2d 377
(R.I. 1982); Tibke v. McDougall, 479 N.W.2d 898 (S.D. 1992); Heil-Quaker Corp. v. Mis-
cher Corp., 863 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom,
657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); Pleas v. City of Seattle, 774 P.2d 1158 (Wash. 1989); Torbett v.
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mulation of the tort as established by both the original Restatement
and the Restatement (Second). 6
Recognition of tortious interference with contract has not won
universal acclaim. The leading treatise on tort law describes tortious
interference as "a rather broad and undefined tort in which no specific
conduct is proscribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for
which the defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes
must be considered improper in some undefined way."' 3 7 Professor
Auerbach has observed that "foreign lawyers reading the Restatement
as an original matter would find it astounding that the whole competi-
tive order of American industry is prima facie illegal. '38  The detri-
mental effect on commerce and individual liberty attributable to
recognition of this tort has been recognized and discussed at length by
at least one commentator.39 Although there has been some brief rec-
ognition that the tort of interference with contract impinges on First
Amendment rights,40 there has been little substantive analysis of the
constitutionality of imposing tort liability for the communication of
truthful information in a commercial setting. This Article suggests
Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co., 314 S.E.2d 166 (W.Va. 1983); Foseid v. State Bank of
Cross Plains, 541 N.W.2d 203 (Wis. 1995); Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr., Inc., 809
P.2d 236 (Wyo. 1991).
36. In Ohio, for example, the elements of the tort of business interference originally
established in Juhasz, 379 N.E.2d 235, were those of the original Restatement. Ohio courts
appeared to adopt the modified formulation of the tort after the publication of the Restate-
ment (Second) in 1979. See Walter v. Murphy, 573 N.E.2d 678, 679-80 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992). Some Ohio courts, however, still cite to Juhasz as the authoritative expression of
the elements of Ohio's common law tort of business interference, rather than to the Re-
statement (Second). See, e.g., Hunter, 654 N.E.2d 405. Recent Ohio Supreme Court prece-
dents have expressly adopted section 766 and have apparently impliedly adopted section
766B. See Kenty, 650 N.E.2d 863, syllabus 2; A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus Cent.
Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio 1995). However, it is possi-
ble to read these two precedents, decided within one month of each other, to establish two
conflicting formulations of one generic tort of tortious interference with contract without
distinguishing between existing and prospective contractual relations.
37. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEnrON ON =rE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at
979 (5th ed. 1984).
38. Statement of Professor Carl Auerbach, 46 A.L.I. PRoc. 201 (1969).
39. See Wexler, supra note 32, at 292.
40. Surprisingly, there appear to be no previously published law review articles di-
rectly addressing the First Amendment as a defense to tortious interference with contract
resulting from the communication of truthful information, except for a very brief discus-
sion in one article addressing the right of attorneys departing a law firm to solicit the firm's
clients, and a passing reference in a second article to the chilling effect on free speech that
would result from the imposition of tort liability for communicating truthful information.
See Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners and Associ-
ates: Tort, Fiduciary and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 96-97 (1988); Wexler,
supra note 32, at 281, 322-25.
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that the imposition of tort liability for the mere communication of
truthful information is a violation of fundamental First Amendment
principles.
I. The "Justification" or "Privilege" for Communicating
Truthful Information
The majority of courts applying sections 766B and 772 of the Re-
statement (Second) have consistently (and correctly) held that the
communication of truthful information does not constitute improper
interference with another's contractual relationships. 41 Courts apply-
ing the law of Wisconsin,42 Pennsylvania,43 New Hampshire,' Illi-
nois,45 Wyoming,46 the District of Columbia,47 Maryland,4 Ohio,49
41. Even prior to the adoption of the Restatement (Second), some courts had already
recognized that the communication of truthful information does not constitute improper
interference with contractual relationships. In Masoni v. Board of Trade, 260 P.2d 205
(Cal. Ct. App. 1953), the defendant invited creditors of the plaintiff to meet with the de-
fendant, who took an assignment of their claims. The assignment granted the defendant
the right to bring an action for collection of all its claims against the plaintiff. The defend-
ant charged a collection fee for this service. The plaintiff brought suit against the defend-
ant, claiming that the defendant's conduct constituted an improper interference with the
contractual relations between the plaintiff and its creditors. The California Court of Ap-
peal disagreed, holding that truthfully informing plaintiff's creditors of the plaintiff's ability
to pay, and of the defendant's willingness to collect the creditor's claims by legal means,
were not unfair or improper. The court also held that the fact that the defendant was
motivated by the prospect of financial gain did not change this result. Id. at 208.
42. See Landess v. Borden, Inc., 667 F.2d 628, 632 n.6 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Section 772 of
the Restatement (Second) creates a privilege for one who merely transmits truthful infor-
mation to the terminating party.... The information Borden provided to the farmers on
February 1, 1980, was truthful, and thus its conduct would be privileged.") (citation omit-
ted); Liebe v. City Fin. Co., 295 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) ("Transmission of
truthful information is privileged and proper."); Kelly v. Western Wisconsin Legal Servs.,
371 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. 1985) ("Because the transmission of truth information is privileged,
a prima facie case was made for dismissing the tortious interference claim."); Aschenbren-
ner v. Sapko, 423 N.W.2d 882 (Wis. 1988) ("[T]he transmission of truthful information is
privileged, does not constitute improper interference with a contract, and cannot subject
one to liability for tortious interference with a contract."); Wilder v. Cody Country Cham-
ber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 225 (Wyo. 1994) ("[T]ruthful statements, solicited or vol-
unteered, are not actionable .... ").
43. See Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump-Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611, 623
n.12 (Pa. Super. 1980) ("Of course, were the jury to conclude that Sheedy imparted only
truthful information to Deshler, Sheedy's interference would not be improper.").
44. See Montrone v. Maxfield, 449 A.2d 1216, 1217-18 (N.H. 1982) ("Additionally, any
truthful information or honest advice given by the defendants after being requested by
seller cannot constitute wrongful interference.").
45. See George A. Fuller Co. v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Med., 719 F.2d 1326,
1332 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Furthermore, section 772 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ex-
plicitly permits giving the third person truthful information."); Vajda v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 624 N.E.2d 1343, 1352 (Il1. App. 1993) ("Also section 772 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts provides that the giving of truthful information does not interfere improperly
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Massachusetts, ° Minnesota, 1 California,52 Florida, 3 Texas,54 and
New Jersey"5 have held that there is no liability under the Restatement
with another person's contractual right."); Soderlund Bros., Inc. v. Carrier Corp., No. 1-92-
4018, 1995 II. App. LEXIS 856, *29 (1995) ("There is no liability for interference with a
prospective contractual relation on the part of one who merely gives truthful information
to another.").
46. See Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 280 (Wyo. 1985) ("Whether solic-
ited or not, comments or notifications, truthfully given, cannot become actionable for tor-
tious interference with a contract of employment."); Four Nines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Constr.,
Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 238 (Wyo. 1991) ("[T]ruthful statements, whether solicited or volun-
teered, are not actionable as intentional interference with prospective contractual
relations.").
47. See International City Management. Ass'n Retirement Corp. v. Watkins, 726 F.
Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1989) ("One competitor is free to communicate truthful information
about another competitor to a third person."); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 848 F. Supp. 1018, 1031 (D.D.C. 1994) ("It is true that this Court has twice before
cited the Restatement of Torts and denied claims of tortious interference where the alleg-
edly tortious acts involved conveying truthful information.").
48. See Weiss v. Lehman, 713 F. Supp. 489, 503 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Even if Katzow's
conduct was intentional, which I do not find, the statement by Katzow that properties
purchased in Phase II were grossly overvalued was a true statement and is not
actionable.").
49. See Scanlon v. Gordon F. Stofer & Bro. Co., Nos. 55467-72, 1989 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2528, at *28 (1989) ("Case law, which has adopted and interpreted Section 772 of
the Restatement of Law 2d, Torts, has specifically held that the communication of truthful
information or honest advice cannot be considered improper and a subject of potential
liability.").
50. See United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 533 N.E.2d 647, 651 n.5 (Mass. App.
1989), superseded, 551 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990) ("We accept § 772 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) as Massachusetts law, and consider truthful information and honest advice matters of
justification for a defendant to establish.").
51. See Lentsch v. Fuller, No. C7-88-2510 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 531, at *2 (1989)
("So long as the information conveyed is truthful, it is immaterial whether or not the infor-
mation was solicited.").
52. See Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 361, 364 (1992) ("If a state-
ment is protected, either because it is true or because it is privileged, that 'protection does
not depend on the label given the cause of action."') (citation omitted); Rickel v. Schwinn
Bicycle Co., 192 Cal. Rptr. 732, 742 (1983) ("We find no wrongfulness in Schwinn's truth-
fully informing McCready of the legitimate business policy which it in fact had."); Arntz
Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 897 (1996)
("[T]ruthful statements to interested parties about one's standard business practices (here,
putting Arntz 'in claim') is not wrongful conduct actionable as intentional interference with
prospective economic relations.").
53. See Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1092 (11th Cir. 1994) (cit-
ing section 772).
54. See Tarleton State Univ. v. Rosiere, 867 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tex. App. 1993)
("[R]ecounting truthful information is not an improper interference.").
55. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 697 (N.J. Super. 1989) ("It
is not improper to give truthful information to a customer about someone else's product,
and this is so even if the purpose is to interfere with an existing or prospective contractual
relationship.").
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(Second) formulation of tortious interference with contract for the
communication of truthful information to third parties.
Accordingly, the motive of the defendant who makes the truthful
disclosure has no relevance to whether the conduct is actionable.
Quite recently, the California Court of Appeal held that "a true repre-
sentation does not become wrongful just because the defendant is mo-
tivated by a black desire to hurt plaintiff's business."56 Similarly, in
Bard, a New Jersey superior court held that the "defendant's motive is
not relevant to the determination of this case.... It is not improper to
give truthful information to a customer about someone else's product,
and this is so even if the purpose is to interfere with an existing or
prospective contractual relationship."'57 And in Weiss, a federal dis-
trict court held that "[e]ven if Katzow's conduct was intentional[,] ...
the statement by Katzow that properties purchased in Phase II were
grossly overvalued was a true statement and is not actionable.158 Fur-
thermore, the defendant need not have any interest under the existing
contract in order to assert the truthful information defense. 9
Despite the Restatement's unambiguous language protecting the
communication of truthful information, a few courts have refused to
acknowledge that truth is an absolute defense. In actions alleging
that the communication of information constituted an intentional in-
terference with contractual relations, these aberrant cases have held
that the absolute defense of truth is not justified on public policy
grounds. However, these cases failed to take into account the First
Amendment protection provided to the communication of truthful in-
formation.60 For example, in Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.,61 the Utah
56. Arntz Contracting Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
57. 561 A.2d at 697.
58. Weiss v. Lehman, 713 F. Supp. 489, 503 (D.D.C. 1989).
59. See, e.g., Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 26 F.3d 1089, 1092 (11th Cir. 1994).
60. In fact, in at least one case, a court expressly denied that truth was an absolute
defense to intentional interference with contractual relations and further denied that there
was any First Amendment right to convey truthful information about the plaintiff to the
plaintiff's employer. See Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292, 296 n.3 (Pa. Super.
1991).
Likewise, in Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97 (Va. 1985), the Virginia Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment does not apply to tortious speech. While the Chaves opin-
ion does not directly address the issue of truth as an absolute defense in intentional inter-
ference cases, it does (erroneously) hold that the Constitution does not protect speech
which rises to the level of a tort. See id. at 103. The Chaves court fails to take into account
the clear holdings of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that state tort law may
not impose liability for constitutionally protected speech. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-79.
61. 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994).
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Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that an action for
intentional interference with economic relations could not be based
on the transmission of truthful information:
Finally, we reject defendants' assertion that under Leigh ajudgment for intentional interference with economic relations
cannot be based on the transmission of truthful information. In
so asserting, defendants rely heavily on section 772(a) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts. Section 772(a) states:
One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform
a contract or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation
with another does not interfere improperly with the other's con-
tractual relation, by giving to the third person . . . truthful
information .....
Defendants' reliance on section 772(a) is misplaced. As our
decision in Leigh makes clear, this court has rejected the various
Restatement formulations of the tort of intentional interference
with economic relations. Under Leigh, "the alternative of im-
proper purpose (or motive, intent, or objective) will support a
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective eco-
nomic relations even where the defendant's means were proper."
Because we explicitly rejected the Restatement versions of the
tort in Leigh and because liability may attach under Leigh even
where a defendant's means were proper, we reject defendants'
call to adopt truthfulness as an absolute defense to the tort of
intentional interference with prospective economic relations. 62
A federal district court applying the law of Rhode Island has also
(erroneously) held that truth is not an absolute defense to an action
for interference with contractual relations. In C.N.C. Chemical Corp.
v. Pennwalt Corp.,63 plaintiff and defendant were competitors.
Pennwalt filed a suit against C.N.C., alleging that a C.N.C. product
infringed one of Pennwalt's patents. Pennwalt dismissed its suit with-
out prejudice. C.N.C. then sued Pennwalt, alleging that Pennwalt dis-
cussed the existence of the earlier infringement suit with one of
C.N.C.'s customers in an attempt to deter the customer from purchas-
ing any more of C.N.C.'s product. Pennwalt responded that all it did
was truthfully inform C.N.C.'s customer of the existence of the suit.
The court concluded that even if that was all that Pennwalt had done,
providing that truthful information to C.N.C.'s customer was still
actionable:
Even if the complaint could be fairly read as alleging no
more than a statement by Pennwalt that a suit was pending; and,
perhaps, a factual recitation of the contents of that suit, dismis-
62. Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
63. 690 F. Supp. 139 (D.R.I. 1988).
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sal would still be inappropriate at this juncture. The general
rule that communicating truthful information does not consti-
tute "improper" interference should not be viewed as absolute.
Its applicability depends upon the circumstances. 64
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, in Stonestreet Marketing Services, Inc. v. Chicago Custom En-
graving, Inc.,65 expressed no opinion as to whether Illinois courts
adhere to the truthful information defense contained in Restatement
section 772.66 However, in dicta, the court stated:
In the absence of clear support [that the Illinois courts would
adopt the truthful information defense of section 772], we be-
lieve that the truthful nature communications simply entitles
Defendants to a qualified or conditional privilege which is a de-
fense unless the jury concludes Defendants abused the privilege
or took action motivated by desires other than the interest pro-
tected by the privilege.67
In Carman v. Entner,68 the Ohio Court of Appeals also missed
the boat on truth as an absolute defense to intentional interference
with contract claims. The court held that the statements made by the
defendants, while true, were nonetheless actionable because of de-
fendants' subjective motivation and because the defendants "stood
nothing to lose" under the contract between the plaintiff and the third
party:
No Ohio case-law exists that produces any bright-line test to de-
termine whether the Entners should avoid liability for tortious
interference with a contract where the same statement produc-
ing the liability is not actionable under as [sic] slander of title.
However, we do not think, as a matter of public policy, that indi-
viduals may escap& liability on the basis that otherwise clear and
unprivileged threats are constructed from statements that are
literally true. It has been recognized in Pennsylvania that
although truth is an absolute defense in defamation actions,
"truth is not a defense to intentional interference with contrac-
tual relations." Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc. (1991), 411 Pa.
Super. 166, 601 A.2d 292, 296, appeal denied, 608 A.2d 27, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 199. Both Ohio and Pennsylvania law are gen-
erally congruent with the Restatement of the Law on the defini-
tion of tortious interference with contractual relations:
64. Id. at 143.
65. No. 93 C 1785, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5548 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
66. Id. at *16 n.2.
67. Id.
68. No. 13978, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 387 (Montgomery App. Feb. 2, 1994).
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One who intentionally and improperly interferes with
another's prospective contractual relation (except a
contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits
of the relation, whether the interference consists of (a)
inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to
enter or continue the prospective relation or (b)
preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.
4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 2D, TORTS (1979) 20, Section
766B.
In Ohio, liability for interference with a business or con-
tractual relationship exists when the defendant's conduct inter-
fered with the business rights of the plaintiff, and, "taking into
consideration the situation and relationship of the parties," the
defendant lacked any privilege to interfere. Juhasz v. Quik
Shops, Inc. (1977), 55 Ohio App. 2d 51, 58, 379 N.E.2d 235. The
privilege to interfere with a contract arises if there is "a bona
fide doubt" as to the remote party's rights under the contract.
There is no liability for tortious interference with a poten-
tial sales contract where the defendant acts to discourage the
prospective contract which he believes in good faith to impair
his legally protected interests. Bell v. Le-Ge Inc. (1985), 20
Ohio App. 3d 127, 485 N.E.2d 282.
One is privileged purposely to cause another not to
perform a contract, or enter into, or continue a busi-
ness relationship with a third person by in good faith
asserting or threatening to protect properly a legally
protected interest of his own which he believes may
otherwise be impaired or destroyed by the perform-
ance of the contract or transaction.
4 RESTATEMENT OF TH LAW 2D (1979), SECTION 773.
We find that the existence of a privilege to interfere with a
contract depends essentially on whether the interfering party
has a need to interfere with the contract. The rule is that where
there is no need to interfere with a contract to protect a genuine
legal right, even truthful statements, calculated to interfere with
the contract, are actionable. The exception is where the inter-
fering party has a bona fide belief that the contract will impair
or destroy his genuine legal rights. Juhasz and Bell, supra.
Under the above rule and exception, the connection be-
tween truth and privilege is a question of fact. And the burden
of proving the defense of a privilege to interfere clearly rests
with the defendant. Proving the truth of all express statements
made to parties to the contract may not always be sufficient to
show that the defendant was privileged to interfere with the
contract. Privilege depends upon the relationship of the parties.
If the defendant stood to lose nothing under the contract, then
no privilege can be said to exist. Moreover, even if the defend-
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ant stood to lose a right under the contract, going beyond what
was reasonably necessary to protect that right may be consid-
ered unprivileged.69
On appeal after remand, the court of appeals repeated its holding
that, as a matter of public policy, an action for intentional interference
with contractual relations can be based upon statements that are liter-
ally true.70
If the issue in these cases were simply one of the elements of
claims and defenses to be established under state tort law, no one
could seriously take issue with the holdings of the courts in Col-
lincini,71 C.N. C. Chemical,72 Pratt,73 Chaves, 4 Stonestreet Marketing,75
and Carman.76 However, the absolute nature of truth as a defense to
intentional interference cases derives not from state tort law, but from
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the cases
that have refused to acknowledge the absolute nature of the defense
are in error.
H. The Communication of Truthfid Information Is
Constitutionally Protected Speech Under the
First Amendment
In determining whether conduct of a defendant constitutes "in-
tentional" and "improper" interference, the courts consistently look
to the motives of the defendant. A few courts, however, have focused
so narrowly on the issue of the defendant's motive that they have for-
gotten that occasionally the defendant's conduct is absolutely pro-
tected as a matter of constitutional law. In those instances, no inquiry
into the defendant's motives is required or even permitted. The diffi-
69. Id. at **19-20, 21-24.
70. Carman v. Entner, No. 14491, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4158, at *3 (Montgomery
App. Sept. 23, 1994) ("[W]e do not think, as a matter of public policy, that individuals may
escape liability on the basis that otherwise clear and unprivileged threats are constructed
from statements that are literally true."). While it is true that a "threat" may be un-
privileged even if the actor truthfully intends to make good on it, the Carman court's ear-
lier holding that truthful statements are generally not privileged unless necessary to
"protect a genuine legal right" of the actor is simply wrong.
71. Collincini v. Honeywell, Inc., 601 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. 1991).
72. C.N.C. Chemical Corp. v. Pennwalt Corp., 690 F. Supp. 139 (D.R.L 1988).
73. Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994).
74. Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97 (Va. 1985).
75. Stonestreet Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Chicago Custom Engraving, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5548 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
76. Carman v. Entner, No. 13978, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 387 (Montgomery App.
Feb. 2, 1994).
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culty has been pointed out by the authors of Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts:
Although there may be no liability for interference with
contract by a mere truthful statement of fact, liability has been
imposed without much question where there is no misstatement
of fact at all and the defendant has merely advised or persuaded
another to breach his contract with the plaintiff, or where the
defendant has merely made the other an offer better than the
plaintiff's contract. Since persuasion or an offer of a better con-
tract is necessarily speech, there is a question whether the First
Amendment, which has had a very sizable impact in the defama-
tion cases, might restrict liability to those cases in which some
degree of personal fault and some false statements of fact are
shown.... At this writing, the only "fault" considered sufficient
to justify a penalty for speech has been fault in ascertaining or
speaking the truth. Conceivably courts may therefore protect
speech that interferes with contracts on the ground that it is a
representation of the truth or at least is not a falsehood; or even
on the ground that however bad the speaker's motive may be,
this kind of fault does not touch the issue of truth or falsity. But
the question is as yet an open one.77
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution7s pro-
tects the freedom of speech; First Amendment freedoms are protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.79 The
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that First Amend-
ment protection of speech is applicable in civil lawsuits between pri-
vate parties. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,80 the plaintiff
brought suit in Alabama state court alleging that he had been libeled
by an advertisement in the defendant's newspaper. The issue before
the Court was whether a state could award damages to a public official
for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct in the absence
of proof of "actual malice." In holding that a demonstration of "ac-
tual malice" was required, the Supreme Court observed that the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and press were applicable in civil
cases involving state law torts:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Ala-
bama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional free-
77. KEETON Er. Al, supra note 37, § 129 at 988-89 (footnotes omitted).
78. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
80. See 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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doms of speech and press. It matters not that law has been ap-
plied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though
supplemented by statute."'
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,8" the defendant organiza-
tion was involved in a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne
County, Mississippi. Speeches encouraging nonparticipants to join the
common cause were given and the boycott was supported by nonvio-
lent picketing. The plaintiff white merchants filed suit in Mississippi
state court for injunctive relief and damages on three separate con-
spiracy theories, including the tort of malicious interference with the
plaintiffs' businesses. In holding that the defendants' activities were
constitutionally protected, the Supreme Court again repeated its ear-
lier holding that the protections for free speech applied even in the
context of a civil lawsuit between private parties: "Although this is a
civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state rules of
law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First
Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth
Amendment."83
A state may not, by manipulating its definition of the elements of
a tort, impose civil liability for constitutionally protected expression.
In Blatty v. New York Times Co.,84 the plaintiff author brought an ac-
tion for damages against the publisher of the New York Times for fail-
ing to include his book in its list of best sellers. The plaintiff's
complaint included a cause of action for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. The Times moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the claims were barred by the First
Amendment. The motion to dismiss was granted by the trial court.
The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of the claim for intentional
interference with prospective advantage. On further appeal, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the
judgment of the trial court dismissing the claim for intentional inter-
ference with prospective advantage:
The Times contends that Blatty's intentional interference
claims-and his other claims as well-do not, and cannot, state
a claim on which relief may be granted. In support it argues,
inter alia, that the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and article I, section 2, of the California Constitution
81. Id at 265.
82. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
83. Id. at 916 n.51.
84. 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986).
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establish an absolute bar to liability. For the reasons that follow,
we agree.
The fundamental premise of Blatty's argument is unsound.
Under the Supremacy Clause, a state's definition of a tort can-
not undermine the requirements of the First Amendment. That
is precisely the teaching of New York Times. 5
The same conclusion has been reached by the Utah Supreme Court8 6
and the Illinois Court of Appeals.'
The United States Supreme Court, and numerous lower courts,
have consistently held that providing truthful information to third par-
ties about the business practices of others is constitutionally protected,
and the First Amendment bars the imposition of civil liability for pro-
viding such truthful information. In Organization for a Better Austin
v. Keefe,88 a case involving the peaceful distribution of leaflets:
Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct
by their activities; this is not fundamentally different from the
function of a newspaper. Petitioners were engaged openly and
vigorously in making the public aware of respondent's real es-
tate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the
views and practices of petitioners are no doubt offensive to
others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the communica-
tion need not meet standards of acceptability. 9
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Delloma v. Consolida-
tion Coal Co.90 observed that "permitting recovery for tortious inter-
ference based on truthful statements would seem to raise significant
First Amendment problems." 91 In Hofmann Co. v. EI Du Pont de
Nemours & Co.,' the California Court of Appeal held that the First
Amendment barred any cause of action for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage on the basis of statements con-
85. Id at 1181, 1186.
86. See Searle v. Johnson, 709 P.2d 328,330 (Utah 1985) ("In addition, state tort law is
not the type of '[g]overmmental regulation that has an incidental effect on First Amend-
ment freedoms [that] may be justified in certain narrowly defined instances .... [W]e are
precluded by the First Amendment itself from gauging the degree of constitutional protec-
tion by the content or subject matter of the speech .... ').
87. See McErlean v. Harvey Area Community Org., 292 N.E.2d 479, 481-82 (Il. App.
1972) ("Even if defendants' actions were the result of a purely economic dispute, the
United States Supreme Court has made it clear that the guarantees of freedom of speech
are not the exclusive preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs.").
88. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
89. Id at 419 (citation omitted).
90. 996 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1993).
91. Id at 172.
92. 248 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
728 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:709
sisting of truthful information.93 The court in Near East Side Commu-
nity Organization v. Hair94 held that the actions of the defendants in
circulating pamphlets complaining about the plaintiff's offensive real
estate practices were constitutionally protected.9
In Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial
Workers' Union,96 the plaintiff grocery store claimed that the defend-
ant's picketing and boycotting activities tortiously interfered with its
right to contract by causing plaintiff to lose business due to a decrease
in consumer shopping. Relying on Claiborne Hardware, the federal
district court held that the defendant's activities in communicating
truthful information to shoppers were constitutionally protected. 7
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary
judgment on the plaintiff's claims of tortious interference.9
Similarly, in Caruso v. Local Union No. 690,99 the plaintiff busi-
nessman brought suit against a Teamsters local arising out of a "do not
patronize" article published in a weekly Teamsters union paper. The
plaintiff sought damages for interference with his business relations.
The Washington Supreme Court, also relying on the United States
Supreme Court decision in Claiborne Hardware, agreed that the publi-
cation of the article was constitutionally protected and dismissed the
business interference claim.100
If the information communicated to the third party is true, the
fact that the actor may be acting from purely economic or other ulte-
rior motives is constitutionally irrelevant. In Garrison v. Louisiana,101
93. See id. at 391 ("Blatty applies here to the extent it bars appellant's cause of action
for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage on the basis of state-
ments consisting either of true facts or opinions.").
94. 555 N.E.2d 1324 (Ind. App. 1990).
95. See id. at 1334 ("Likewise, the defendants in the present case were engaged in
making the public aware of the Hairs' real estate practices which were offensive to them.
We find the NESCO actions, in this regard, are constitutionally protected.").
96. 840 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
97. See id at 706 ("Plaintiff's state law claim for tortious interference must fail because
the defendant's activities (as listed by Plaintiff in Count I of the Second Amended Com-
plaint) are constitutionally protected.").
98. See Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 197 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The protection afforded under the First
Amendment is not diminished where the communications are intended to exercise a coer-
cive impact.") (citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971)).
99. 670 P.2d 240 (Wash. 1983).
100. See id. at 242 ("Petitioner's only contention before this court is that the publication
of the articles is constitutionally protected and cannot give rise to liability for the tort of
business interference under NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co.... We agree.").
101. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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the United States Supreme Court adopted the following statement
from an earlier decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court:
If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has
published the truth, and no more, there is no sound principle
which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by express
malice....
It has been said that it is lawful to publish truth from good
motives, and for justifiable ends. But this rule is too narrow. If
there is a lawful occasion-a legal right to make a publication-
and the matter is true, the end is justifiable, and that, in such
case, must be sufficient.102 The rule that the motives of the ac-
tor are constitutionally irrelevant has consistently been followed
by both state and federal courts in the context of tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations cases.'0 3
In 1988, in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,"°4 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly stated that the motivation of the actor is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether speech is entitled to constitutional protection:
[un the world of debate about public affairs, many things done
with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the
First Amendment[;] ... even when a speaker or writer is moti-
vated by hatred or ill-will, his expression [is] protected by the
First Amendment.' 5
A review of the pertinent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the communication of truthful
information in a commercial setting is constitutionally protected.
More than fifty years ago, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,'" the
Supreme Court held that the constiutional value of speech is deter-
mined in terms of whether the speech was "a step to truth.' 0 7 In
Garrison v. Louisiana,08 the Court determined that plaintiff's "inter-
est in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, se-
cured by the Constitution in the dissemination of truth."'1 9 This
analysis led to a definitive rule laid down by the Garrison Court:
"Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions
102. Id at 73 (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42-43 (1837)).
103. See Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc., 39 F.3d at 197; Johnston Dev. Group v.
Carpenters' Local Union No. 1578,712 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (D. NJ. 1989) ("[T]he fact that
the defendants may have had an ulterior motive behind their 'public interest' handbilling is
irrelevant if the message itself is protected.").
104. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
105. Id. at 53 (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. 64).
106. 315 U.S. 568 (1941).
107. Id. at 572.
108. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
109. Id. at 73.
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where discussion of public affairs is concerned." 110 In fact, the
Supreme Court has subsequently held that the First Amendment's
central purpose is to facilitate the "common quest for truth," ' and
to provide "an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will
ultimately prevail."' 1
2
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court rejected as "highly pater-
nalistic" a state regulation preventing the dissemination of
"concededly truthful information" about drug prices because the gov-
ernment was fearful of that information's effect." 4 The Court further
concluded that the First Amendment is the overriding public policy
consideration that protects the communication of truthful informa-
tion, even in commercial settings, when it held that "it is precisely this
kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and
the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amend-
ment makes for us.""' 5 Concluding that the First Amendment does
indeed protect purely commercial speech," 6 the Court maintained
that a state may not regulate the dissemination of truthful commercial
information because of the effect that it may have on the recipient:
What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress
the dissemination of concededly true information about entirely
lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its dis-
seminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we
conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative." 7
Since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that commercial speech is entitled to constitutional
protection under the First Amendment. In Edenfield v. Fane,1 8 the
Supreme Court held that truthful, nonmisleading commercial infor-
mation that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is
entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment. 1 9 And recently, in
110. Id at 74.
111. Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984).
112. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
113. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
114. Id. at 770, 773.
115. Id. at 770; see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
116. See Wrginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24 ("[Clommercial speech
enjoys First Amendment protection.").
117. Id. at 773.
118. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
119. Id. at 767.
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Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,120 the Court held that the government
could not prohibit Coors from disclosing truthful, verifiable, and non-
misleading factual information about alcohol content on its beer
labels. 12'
In 1980, the Supreme Court established a three-part test for re-
viewing commercial speech restrictions in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amend-
ment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more ex-
tensive than necessary to serve that interest.123
This three-part test was cited and applied by the Supreme Court in
Rubin124 and Edenfield."-
One of the most sweeping statements about the breath of First
Amendment protection given to truthful commercial speech came in
the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Ibanez v. Florida Depart-
ment of Business & Professional Regulation.'26 In Ibanez, the peti-
tioner was a member of the Florida bar, a certified public accountant
and a certified financial planner. She used the latter two credentials in
her advertising and other communication with the public concerning
her law practice. Notwithstanding the truthfulness of this information,
she was reprimanded by the entity that regulated the practice of ac-
countancy in Florida for mentioning it in her yellow pages listing and
on her business cards and stationery. 27 In holding that the petitioner
had a First Amendment right to utilize this truthful information in her
contacts with the public, the Supreme Court stated that:
Because "disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more
likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is
120. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
121. Id. at 1590.
122. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2376
(1995), the Court described the Central Hudson test as having "three related prongs." Pre-
viously, the Court had referred to the analysis of commercial speech as a four-part test.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
123. Id. at 566.
124. 115 S. Ct. at 1589.
125. 113 S. Ct. at 1798.
126. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
127. Id. at 2085.
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concealment of such information," only false, deceptive, or mis-
leading commercial speech may be banned.28
Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or mislead-
ing can be restricted, but only if the State shows that the restric-
tion directly and materially advances a substantial state interest
in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.129
Most recently, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 30 the issue
presented was whether Rhode Island could, consistent with the First
Amendment, prohibit truthful, nonmisleading price advertising re-
garding alcoholic beverages. Observing that "[t]he First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good,'' the Supreme Court stated that bans against truthful, non-
misleading speech about a lawful product "rarely survive constitu-
tional review.' 1 32  The Court concluded that Rhode Island's
prohibition against advertisements stating the true price at which li-
quor would be offered for sale was unconstitutional:
Last Term we held that a federal law abridging a brewer's
right to provide the public with accurate information about the
alcoholic content of malt beverages is unconstitutional. We now
hold that Rhode Island's statutory prohibition against advertise-
ments that provide the public with accurate information about
retail prices of alcoholic beverages is also invalid. Our holding
rests on the conclusion that such an advertising ban is an
abridgement of speech protected by the First Amendment
It is clear that the publication of truthful information by one busi-
ness competitor concerning its competitors, its pricing, or its product
is commercial speech protected under the First Amendment. But as
recently as 1989, the Supreme Court expressly left open the issue of
whether the communication of truthful information could ever be
civilly or criminally punishable consistent with the First Amend-
ment. 34 In Florida Star v. B.JF, 35 the Supreme Court held that
128. Id at 2088 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
129. Id (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
130. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
131. Id at 1508.
132. Id.
133. Id at 1501 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995)).
134. In several cases prior to 1989, the Supreme Court had also reserved ruling on the
issue of whether truthful statements could ever constitutionally be punished. In Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Court held that a cause of action for
invasion of privacy based upon the public disclosure of a rape victim's name "imposes
sanctions on pure expression-the content of a publication-and not conduct or a combi-
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"where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has law-
fully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only
when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order. ' 136 In
doing so, however, the Supreme Court expressly reserved ruling on
whether truthful publications could ever be punished in light of the
First Amendment:
Nor need we accept appellant's invitation to hold broadly
that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with
the First Amendment. Our cases have carefully eschewed
reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may
bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving antic-
ipatorily. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931) (hypothesizing "publication of the sailing dates
of transports or the number and location of troops"); see also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8, 74 (1964) (endorsing
absolute defense of truth "where discussion of public affairs is
concerned," but leaving unsettled the constitutional implications
of truthfulness "in the discrete area of purely private libels");
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838
(1978); Tine, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967). Indeed,
in Cox Broadcasting, we pointedly refused to answer even the
less sweeping question "whether truthful publications may ever
be subjected to civil or criminal liability" for invading "an area
of privacy" defined by the State. Respecting the fact that press
freedom and privacy rights are both "plainly rooted in the tradi-
tions and significant concerns of our society," we instead fo-
cused on the less sweeping issue "whether the State may impose
sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape vic-
tim obtained from public records-more specifically, from judi-
cial records which are maintained in connection with a public
prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspec-
tion." We continue to believe that the sensitivity and signifi-
cance of the interests presented in clashes between First
Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited princi-
nation of speech and non-speech elements that otherwise might be open to regulation or
prohibition," id. at 495. It declined, however, to "address the broader question of whether
truthful publications may ever be subject to civil or criminal liability consistently with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. .. ." Id at 491 (emphasis added).
Several years later, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that a state cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, publish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully
obtained by a newspaper, see id at 103. The Court expressly observed that "[o]ur recent
decisions demonstrate that state action to punish the publication of truthful information
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Id. at 102.
135. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
136. Id at 541.
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ples that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of
the instant case.137
The Supreme Court also discussed the First Amendment right to
communicate truthful information in Butterworth v. Smith.138 In But-
terworth, respondent reporter testified before a grand jury about al-
leged improprieties committed by certain public officials.139 At the
time of his testimony, respondent was warned that if he revealed his
testimony in any manner, he would be subject to criminal prosecution
under state law."4° After the grand jury terminated its investigation,
respondent, who wanted to write about the investigation's subject
matter, including his grand jury testimony, filed suit in federal district
court seeking declaratory relief that the federal statute was an uncon-
stitutional abridgment of his speech and for injunctive relief prevent-
ing his prosecution.141 In holding that the statute violated First
Amendment principles because it prohibited a grand jury witness
from disclosing his own testimony after the grand jury's term had
ended, 42 the Supreme Court reiterated its earlier position that
"where a person 'lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance,' we have held that 'state officials may not con-
stitutionally punish publication information, absent a need to further
a state interest of the highest order."' 43
Another interesting but as yet unresolved issue involves the re-
lated tort of public disclosure of private facts. The United States
Supreme Court has yet to address the question of whether a commu-
nication of truthful facts about a business rival to one of its existing or
potential customers implicates the tort of public disclosure of private
facts. 44 It is clear that the First Amendment applies to the tort of
public disclosure of private facts. In Gilbert v. Medical Economics
Co.,14s the defendants published an article in a medical economics
journal outlining two incidents in which the plaintiff, an anesthesiolo-
gist, allegedly committed malpractice in the operating room and in-
137. Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
138. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
139. Id at 626.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 628.
142. See id. at 637.
143. Id. at 632 (citing Smith, 443 U.S. at 103, and Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533).
144. The Supreme Court has only specifically mentioned the tort of public disclosure of
private facts in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,571 n.7 (1977).
Zacchini involved the plaintiff's "right of publicity" and therefore did not address the con-
stitutionality of the tort of public disclosure of private facts. I&.
145. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
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flicted fatal or severely disabling injuries upon his patients.16 Plaintiff
sued, arguing that the article constituted a public disclosure of private
facts,147 and violated her privacy by casting her in a "false light before
the public."'148 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized
that "the First Amendment at least sometimes protects what would
otherwise be an actionable invasion of privacy where a publication by
the media is involved."'149 The court held that the First Amendment
clearly applied to the tort of public disclosure of private facts. 5 ° The
court added, however, that the First Amendment protection is not ab-
solute, but must be based upon a balance between the right of the
press to disseminate newsworthy information to the public and the
right to privacy.'' The crucial issue, the Tenth Circuit held, was
whether the truthful information was of legitimate concern to the pub-
ic.'5 2 The First Amendment ceases to protect the publisher only
when the publisher abuses its "broad discretion" to publish matters
that are of legitimate public interest."'5 3 The Gilbert court concluded
that publication of the plaintiff's name and photograph in connection
with this article constituted a truthful representation that was "sub-
stantially relevant to a newsworthy topic," and was therefore pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 54
Another case involving a media defendant is McNamara v. Free-
dom Newspapers, Inc.'55 In McNamara, the defendant newspaper
published a photograph taken during a high school soccer game.'
5 6
The photograph accurately depicted plaintiff student running full
stride chasing a soccer ball, but also showed the plaintiff's exposed
genitalia.' 57 Plaintiff student brought suit for invasion of privacy
based on public disclosure of private facts, as well as claims for negli-
gent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 58 The trial court
granted defendant newspaper summary judgment on the ground that
the publication was protected by the First Amendment' 59 The appel-
146. IM at 306 (citations omitted).
147. See id
148. Id. at 310.
149. IM at 307.
150. See iU
151. See id at 308.
152. See id
153. Id.
154. See id. at 308-09.
155. 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
156. See id. at 903 (citing Neff v. Time Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976)).
157. See id
158. See id
159. See id
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late court affirmed, holding that "a factually accurate public disclosure
is not tortious when connected with a newsworthy event even though
offensive to ordinary sensibilities."' 60
A third case involving media defendants is Prahl v. Brosamle.
161
In Prahl, plaintiffs were a research foundation, a research corporation,
and their executive director and president, Dr. Prahl.162 Prahl owned
the land and the building which housed the laboratory and offices of
the foundation and corporation. 63 One evening, the local police de-
partment received a complaint that shots had been fired at four boys
who were bicycling in the area surrounding Prahl's land.'6 The report
was investigated by police, and employees of defendant broadcasting
company broadcast news accounts concerning the incident. 65 Plain-
tiff admitted that several boys had been playing with antique cars that
he kept on the premises and that he had asked the boys to leave.
66
After they did so, the plaintiff shot at a gopher with a .22 caliber
rifle.167 Defendants filmed the arrival of squad cars as they entered
plaintiff's property. 68 Defendants broadcast the story which con-
tained shots of police cars driving up to the building, officers holding
the confiscated guns, and Dr. Prahl talking to the officers in his of-
fice.' 69 The gist of the broadcast was that Dr. Prahl had been charged
with the crime of reckless use of a weapon. Prahl brought a complaint
against the defendants, alleging that his privacy was invaded through
the release of information obtained in confidence from him in a crimi-
nal investigation. 70 On the authority of the Supreme Court's decision
in Paul v. Davis,171 the court rejected the argument that the publica-
tion of this truthful information was actionable.1 72
160. Ld. at 904.
161. 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
162. See id. at 772.
163. See id.
164. See id&
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See iL
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id at 773-74.
171. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, plaintiff claimed a right to damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 because of a public statement by police that the plaintiff had been arrested for
shoplifting. Ld. at 694-95. The Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional protec-
tion against the truthful public disclosure of the fact of an arrest. See id. at 713.
172. See Prahl, 295 N.W2d at 774.
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In Montesano v. Donrey Media Group,7 3 plaintiff contended that
defendants wrongfully published his involvement in a hit-and-run ac-
cident twenty years earlier, in which a police officer was killed." 4
Plaintiff argued that because the accident occurred long before publi-
cation, the article was not newsworthy and defendants should be held
liable for publicly disclosing private facts.'75 The trial court dismissed
the complaint with prejudice because no publication of private facts
occurred, and thus the complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.176 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the
decision holding that the "tort of public disclosure of private facts di-
rectly confronts the constitutional freedoms of speech and press."'1 7
7
The Montesano court noted that, after Cox Broadcasting, the Kansas
Supreme Court had rejected the test of "current newsworthiness"
which would have required a case-by-case evaluation of the current
public interest in cases where the truthful facts published concerned a
present or former official.' 78 The Montesano court concluded that, at
least where the publication involves public record or public facts
which have been displayed, the "balance should be weighted in favor
of free speech.' 79
Regrettably, there are virtually no cases discussing the constitu-
tionality of the tort of public disclosure of private facts by nonmedia
defendants.180 One of the few decisions even to touch upon the issue
was the federal district court decision in Crain v. KrehbieL 181 In
Crain, plaintiff provided Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
agents with information which led to the seizure of a one-half ton of
marijuana and to the arrest and conviction of an individual named
Lamkin. 8' Plaintiff provided the information only on the condition
173. 668 P.2d 1081 (Nev. 1983).
174. See id at 1082-83.
175. See id. at 1083.
176. See id at 1084.
177. Id at 1087 (citing Cox Broad Corp., 420 U.S. at 489).
178. See id. at 1087-88 (citing Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publ'g Co., 543 P.2d 988, 996
(Kan. 1975)).
179. lId at 1088.
180. An argument can be made that no distinction should be drawn between media and
nonmedia defendants in this setting in light of the "general principle that members of the
media have 'no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' Kahn v.
Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), modified and reh'g denied, 1991
Cal. App. LEXIS 1031 (Cal. App. 1991) (citing Associated Press v. Labor Bd., 301 U.S.
103, 132-33 (1937)); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972); Brown v. Kelly
Broad. Co., 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. 1989).
181. 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
182. Id at 205.
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that the agents would try to keep his identity confidential. 18 3 Plaintiff
did not allege or prove that the DEA agents ever disclosed his identity
to Lamkin,184 but contended that the agents' threats to do so consti-
tuted a violation of his right to privacy.'8 5 The court concluded that
"plaintiff's failure to allege any actual or potential 'alteration of legal
status' caused by the defendants' threatened conduct defeated his gen-
eral constitutional claim that his right of privacy was violated."'1 86 The
court went on to observe that the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v.
Davis did not necessarily mean that a public disclosure of private facts
could never violate the Constitution. 87
The upshot of the applicable First Amendment cases is that the
communication of truthful information cannot lead to civil liability so
long as: (1) the information was lawfully obtained;' 88 (2) the actor has
not expressly or impliedly agreed not to disclose the information;
189
(3) disclosure of the information would not constitute a public disclo-
sure of private facts; 90 and (4) disclosure of the information would
not impinge upon some "state interest of the highest order"' 91 or,
where commercial speech is involved, a "substantial" government
interest. 92
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Id at 207.
186. Id. at 209.
187. Id.
188. In Florida Star, the Supreme Court protected the publication only of lawfully ob-
tained truthful information and refused to address the constitutionality of punishment for
the publication of unlawfully acquired truthful information. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
532, 535 n.8, 541 (1989); accord Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990); Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979). But see Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 840 (1978) (holding that the First Amendment protects the com-
munication of truthful information, even where it is of a kind "withheld by law from the
public domain").
189. Where the actor has agreed not to disclose the truthful information but does so
anyway, truth should still be an absolute defense to tort liability based on the disclosure.
However, the actor could be held liable for breach of contract based on the unauthorized
disclosure. The First Amendment right to free speech can, like other rights, be waived by
contract. See, e.g., ITr Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 780 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (citing cases holding that First Amendment rights were waived by contract).
190. See Gilbert v. Medical Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981)
191. See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103).
192. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,566
(1980).
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Conclusion
Under the Restatement (Second) formulation of the elements of
tortious interference, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the alleged interference was both "intentional" and "improper."
The Restatement (Second) further provides that merely providing
truthful information to another does not constitute "improper"
interference.
Some courts have taken issue with the Restatement (Second) for-
mulation. These courts have found that, as a matter of public policy,
an actor who provides truthful information to another who then dis-
continues, or refuses to enter into, a contract with the plaintiff should
nonetheless be subject to liability if the actor's motive was impure or
the actor had no financial stake in the existing contract between the
plaintiff and the third party. Those courts, however, have disregarded
the clearly expressed sentiments of the United States Supreme Court
and other courts that there is virtually no set of circumstances under
which the communication of truthful information to another can sub-
ject an individual to civil or criminal liability.
Because the communication of truthful information in a commer-
cial setting is constitutionally protected, courts do not have the option
of deciding, on public policy grounds, that one party should be sub-
jected to tort liability for providing truthful information to another.
As a matter of federal constitutional law, an actor cannot be subjected
to tort liability for communicating truthful information to another
which leads the other to discontinue or refuse to enter into a contract
with the plaintiff where: (1) the truthful information was lawfully ob-
tained; (2) the actor did not expressly or impliedly agree not to dis-
close the information; (3) the disclosure does not constitute a public
disclosure of private facts about the plaintiff; and (4) the disclosure
does not impinge upon some "state interest of the highest order."
Courts holding otherwise are in error.

